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A Ab bs st tr ra ac ct t
The specific characteristics of genetic data lead to ethical-legal conflicts in the framework of genetic diagnosis.
Several international organisations, including UNESCO and the Council of Europe, have enacted rules referring
to the use of genetic information. This paper discusses possible legal and ethical criteria that could be used in
genetic testing.
I In nt tr ro od du uc ct ti io on n
Specific questions regarding the ethics of genetic
testing in cancer diagnosis have been raised because of
the specific characteristics of the data obtained. The
obtaining and use of genetic data have several peculiar
implications for the rights of the patients and their
relatives, and frequently practitioners and researchers
face new conflicts, to which law and ethics try to give an
answer. This concern has increased because, in general,
law cannot provide a concrete answer to each concrete
situation and, furthermore, there is no regulation of
genetic analysis or genetic data in several countries. For
these reasons, practitioners often need to make personal
decisions in these situations. Some criteria to manage
genetic information in cancer diagnosis will be presented
in this article.
T Th he e   s sp pe ec ci if fi ic c   c ch ha ar ra ac ct te er ri is st ti ic cs s   o of f   g ge en ne et ti ic c   d da at ta a
It has been proposed that if genetic data are
different from other health data they require specific
ethical and legal reflection. This position is known as
genetic exceptionalism [1].
As has been said, some characteristics of genetic
data are shared by other health data, but what is
peculiar is the presence of all of these special
characteristics and this circumstance means that around
the genetic data several different interests are involved,
and this has real effects, such as the need for
recommendations in this field.
In 2004, the European Commission published 
a document with twenty-five recommendations on
ethical, legal and social implications of genetic testing
in which it said that “genetic exceptionalism should be
avoided, internationally, in the context of the EU and
at the level of its Member States. However, the public
perception that genetic testing is different needs to be
acknowledged and addressed. All medical data,
including genetic data, must satisfy equally high
standards of quality and confidentiality” [2]. It is true
that the principles to be applied to solve the conflicts
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applicable to conflicts in the field of health information
in general and in this sense the ethical and juridical
basis of the protection is the same. However, those
conflicts are different and therefore a particular
projection of the general principles to the problems
raised in genetic testing is needed. The fact that the
European Commission felt the need to publish its
twenty-five recommendations also suggests the
exceptional nature of genetic data.
The International Convention on Law and
Biomedicine pays attention to the human genome in
a particular chapter, and to predictive genetic testing
in article 12, stating: “Tests which are predictive of
genetic diseases or which serve either to identify the
subject as a carrier of a gene responsible for a disease
or to detect a genetic predisposition or susceptibility to
a disease may be performed only for health purposes
or for scientific research linked to health purposes, and
subject to appropriate genetic counselling” [3].
Moreover, on 16 October 2003, the UNESCO
enacted the International Declaration on Human
genetic data [4], which points out that human genetic
data have special status because:
(1) they can be predictive of genetic predispositions
concerning individuals;
(2) they may have a significant impact on the family,
including offspring, extending over generations,
and in some instances on the whole group to
which the person concerned belongs;
(3) they may contain information the significance of
which is not necessarily known at the time of
collection of the biological samples;
(4) they may have cultural significance for persons
or groups.
It could be added that [5]:
(5) genetic data remain the same throughout life
(and after death);
(6) they can be obtained from all cells of the human
body (so the parts separated from the body are
a support of the information);
(7) they can be found unexpectedly;
(8) there is great scientific interest in the study of
individuals’ genomes.
The principles of the UNESCO Declaration are
applied to the genetic data, as well as to the proteomic
data and to the biological samples. That is to say, the
Declaration chooses a wide frame of application, which
is suitable to achieve adequate protection of the rights
of the subject. Let us remember that biological samples
are a physical support of all the genetic information of
an individual and this material is not under the
protection of data protection laws. Because of the rapid
accumulation of biological samples in hospitals and
research centres and of the scientific interest in use of
these samples, the protection that is granted to the
genetic information must be extended to the biological
sample as a physical support of information.
Secondly, another question that has been debated
in different forums is the concept of genetic information
regarding its specific protection. In this matter, there
are two options: the first one is to restrict the concept
to the information obtained from the analysis of nucleic
acids; and the second one is wider, and includes any
genetic information obtained from any scientific analysis
or (routine) genetic counselling.
The Declaration has chosen this second notion
correctly. The alternative would be to establish two
separate categories of information. However, these two
types of information can both lead to (very similar) genetic
diagnoses. For example, DNA testing as well as taking
and verifying a family history and performing physical
examinations looking for external signs of hereditary
syndromes could each lead to a genetic diagnosis.
T Th he e   p pr ro oj je ec ct ti io on n   o of f   t th he e   r ri ig gh ht ts s   o of f   p pa at ti ie en nt ts s   
i in n   g ge en ne et ti ic c   d di ia ag gn no os si is s
Conflicts in genetic counselling practice are in fact
legal conflicts between rights or interests of persons
involved somehow in the genetic diagnosis. The more
objective way to solve these conflicts is an approach
to the legal framework in this field. It is true that in some
countries there is no legal regulation on genetic
analysis [6], but general legal principles can be
projected to this specific field, and there are some
international legal instruments, as discussed previously,
with juridical or ethical value in these countries.
P Pr ri iv va ac cy y  a an nd d  c co on nf fi id de en nt ti ia al li it ty y
One of the most frequent dilemmas in the process
of genetic counselling is how to manage genetic
information relevant for the index case in a family, when
he/she does not want to share it with relatives [7], that
is to say, how to solve a conflict between the right to
privacy (of the index case) and the right to health
protection (of the family).
Some believe that the subject of the genetic
information is not the individual but the biological
family, and that therefore the duty of secrecy of genetic
information does not apply in relation to the biological
family of the patient [8].
According to this position, the biological family is
the juridical subject of the genetic information, because
the genetic characteristics are shared between its
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members. Following this, the traditional model of
privacy in the health care system that is based on the
extreme individualism of western cultures has to be
changed [9].
The nondirective genetic council is the one where the
physician does not interfere in the individual decisions of
the patient, and provides the freedom to take individual
decisions. According to the aforementioned position, the
nondirective genetic council is neither ethical nor effective.
This is because the family is not just a biological reality
or a set of separate individuals. On the contrary, the
“genetic family” has to be taken into account in the legal
framework. The decisions to be taken in relation to the
genetic information correspond to more than one
individual. In conclusion, in relation to the genetic
information there has arisen a new legally relevant group,
the biological group. All its members have a right of
access to the genetic information of the other members.
From this legal point of view, genetic information on one
relative from a family would belong to all relatives.
However, we have to bear in mind that, at least from
the biological perspective, it is not defensible to view the
total identification of the members of the family as one
and the same subject. This is because the extent of genetic
material shared between relatives is a probability that
depends on the inheritance mechanisms. For this simple
reason, genetic information on a particular individual
does not have equal implications for each of the other
relatives. We also have to bear in mind that it is difficult
to delimit the extent of the group that has to be considered
the subject of the genetic information (cousins, second
cousins, third cousins, etc.?). In addition, the gene
expression also depends on other non-genetic factors
(cultural, environmental, habits etc.). These are different
between individuals, even between monozygotic twins.
Therefore, carrying the same mutation does not imply the
same consequence for two individuals.
Moreover, as far as we know, the national
legislations have not adopted specific criteria that
consider as subject of the genetic information individuals
other than the one from whom it is obtained. This
criterion is also followed in international regulations
mentioned before, such as the Universal Declaration of
UNESCO on the protection of genetic data, or the
Convention of Biomedicine of the Council of Europe,
which recognize the rights regulated for an individual.
So, and according to the UNESCO Declaration,
human genetic data should not be disclosed or made
accessible to third parties, in particular employers,
insurance companies, educational institutions and the
family, except in two cases:
a) for an important reason of public interest in cases
restrictively provided for by domestic law consistent
with the international law of human rights, or
b) when the prior, free, informed and express consent
of the person concerned has been obtained provided
that such consent is in accordance with domestic law
and the international law of human rights.
That is to say that the general rule or principle is
the duty of confidentially and only if a law authorises
or the patient consents could the physician reveal this
information to others. However, as stated before,
conflicts can exist between this duty and the possibility
to prevent harm in relatives by informing them of the
genetic diagnosis in their family [10]. The most
appropriate action in these cases is to try to convince
patients to inform their relatives, and the best option is
to discuss this with patients at the beginning of the
process of genetic counselling.
Still, the breach of the duty of professional secrecy
can be justified in some circumstances [11], such as
the need to protect other rights or the obligation to
carry out other duties.
In the healthcare framework, physicians usually
confront various conflicts between the duty of secrecy
and the need to avoid important harms. These conflicts
arise, for example, in relation to contagious diseases
(such as AIDS) or diseases of another nature (such as
psychiatric disorders).
A similar conflict can arise in relation to information
on a hereditary disorder given the possibility that other
members of the family may carry the gene for this
disorder. But what harm would be avoided in this case
by the breach of the duty of secrecy? To answer this
question the seriousness of the disease, the existence
of therapy or preventive measures, and the possibility
that the relatives might know by other means the
contingency of carrying the pathological gene, must
be taken into account [12]. Likewise, it must be taken
into account whether these relatives would wish not to
know such a circumstance.
Spouses and partners could also have an interest
in knowing the possibility of their offspring being born
with a genetic predisposition to cancer. This situation
is different from the one that involves the blood relatives
since the negative effects of the secret could be more
evident. It is true that spouses and partners have 
a general duty to take care of the offspring, but it would
be difficult (not impossible) to find a direct and
adequate relation between the harm (the impossibility
of taking care of the offspring) and the omission of
genetic information. Furthermore, the omission of the
information could be justified in the exercise of the right
to privacy. There is no general rule in this sense; the
conflicts should be resolved case by case.
Another interesting point related to access to family
data is the question of protection of the clinical records
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of the deceased patients, which in the context of genetic
counselling could be very useful. Directive 95/46/EC
[13] on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data does not mention the
protection of the data of the deceased (because
personal rights cease after death), but from the ethical
perspective the duty to secrecy remains even in this case.
Rules regarding access to the clinical records of the
deceased families have to respect the same principles
applied to solve conflicts between family members
taking into account the rule of proportionality of the
damage [14]. In the case of use of biological samples,
these materials should not be removed or supplied for
research activities if the deceased person is known to
have objected to it (article 13 of Recommendation R
(06) 4 of the Council of Europe, on research on
biological materials of human origin [15]).
In addition, the issue of informing relatives of their
risk is now being cast in terms of familial and social
responsibility [10]. Moreover, it has been discussed
whether not communicating a genetic diagnosis with
relatives could be the basis for legal responsibility
because of a breach of duty. This conflict has been
analysed even in courts, for example in two interesting
court decisions from the United States that have been
commented on by Gary McAbee, Hack Sherman and
Barbara Davidoff-Feldman [16]. We do not know any
juridical rules in this sense, so general rules about legal
responsibility should be followed to evaluate the
consequences of the omission. In brief, firstly, a criminal
responsibility derived of an omission of help will arise
if an imminent and obvious risk could have been
avoided with the disclosure of the information. It seems
that only in very exceptional cases are these
circumstances found in the omission of genetic
information. Secondly, a civil responsibility would arise.
In this sense it is important to identify the duty that has
been breached, as could be the duty of care (only for
the physician’s patients). The American Society of
Clinical Oncology believes that the cancer care
provider’s obligations (if any) to at-risk relatives are
best fulfilled by the communication of familial risk to
the person undergoing testing, emphasizing the
importance of sharing this information with family
members so that they may also benefit [17].
Regarding the responsibility of the patient who does
not communicate the genetic data to his/her relatives,
as there is no specific regulation it has to follow the
general rule. Hence, in this case, it is important to
identify a duty breached, for example the duty to take
care of offspring. Very interesting in this sense is the
exception to this general rule in the French Law n°
2004-800 du 6 août 2004 relative à la bioéthique,
according to which, the fact that the patient does not
disclose to his or her family information related to 
a genetic anomaly cannot be the basis for liability
against him or her («Le fait pour le patient de ne pas
transmettre l’information relative à son anomalie
génétique dans les conditions prévues au troisième
alinéa ne peut servir de fondement à une action en
responsabilité à son encontre»).
T Th he e  r ri ig gh ht t  t to o  d de ec ci id de e  w wh he et th he er r  t to o  l le ea ar rn n  t th he e  t te es st ts s  r re es su ul lt ts s
The Biomedicine Convention of the Council of
Europe mentioned explicitly recognition of the right “not
to know” in the biomedical field. The coming into force
of this Convention has represented for some countries
an innovation in this respect. This is because it
incorporates into the national law a new right or a new
dimension of the right to self determination.
According to article 10: “1. Everyone has the right
to respect for private life in relation to information about
his or her health. 2. Everyone is entitled to know any
information collected about his or her health. However,
the wishes of individuals not to be so informed shall be
observed. 3. In exceptional cases, restrictions may be
placed by law on the exercise of the rights contained in
paragraph 2 in the interests of the patient”.
The UNESCO Declaration says that when human
genetic data, human proteomic data or biological
samples are collected for medical and scientific
research purposes, the information provided at the
time of the consent should indicate that the person
concerned has the right to decide whether or not to
be informed of the results.
The right not to know is part of the right to the
autonomy of the patient that must be respected, even
if its exercise could imply damage or risk to his or her
health. So the same can be said about the right not to
be informed.
The exercise of this right is not an obstacle to the
validity of informed consent. For example, a patient
can consent to a removal of a tumour without knowing
the characteristics of it. This is the rule stated in the
Biomedicine Convention of the Council of Europe.
But there could be exceptions to this principle that
have to be regulated by each national law. It is not
clear whether the interest of the patient could be one
of these exceptions.
When appropriate, the right not to be informed
should be extended to identified relatives who may be
affected by the results. However, it must be taken into
account that, in many situations, the wish of the subject
is not certainly known. That is the case when unexpected
information is found or when the relatives do not know
anything about the possibility of carrying a disease.
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In each particular situation, concrete benefits and
adverse consequences of the communication must be
taken into account when deciding about informing.
According to the guide to clinical practices in relation
to familial aspects of cancer [18] for those found to
carry a mutation, potential benefits include:
• they can be informed about the chances that their
children have of carrying the mutation; consequently
they can contribute to advice to their children to be
tested;
• they can make informed decisions about initiating 
a pregnancy, fetal testing and possible termination
of pregnancy;
• they can be advised on surveillance aimed at early
diagnosis, and on preventive treatment.
For those found to carry a mutation, potential
adverse consequences include:
• anxiety based on concern for themselves and their
own future;
• anxiety and guilt regarding the now high-risk status
of their children;
• difficulties to be confronted with regard to choices
about future pregnancies;
• the stress of being the bearer of bad news in the
family;
• disruption to family relationships;
• concerns about uncertain consequences of the
recording of the test result;
•  uncertainty about the possible misuse of the
information, at the present time or in the future.
These factors must be applied to the particular
situation, and regarding the result of evaluation of all
of them, a presumption of the wish of being informed
must be established.
The presumptions have to be established bearing
in mind the benefit and the prejudice to the subject.
Therefore, except in some clear situations, the physician
will face important doubts in taking a decision whether
or not to inform the patient about any unexpected
findings. In this decision not only objective factors must
be taken into account, such as the possibility of therapy,
but also subjective ones, such as the personality of the
patient, the consequences of getting this information,
and other familiar circumstances.
Recommendation R (92) 3 of the Council of
Europe, on genetic testing and screening for health
care purposes [19], establishes that “In conformity with
national legislation, unexpected findings may be
communicated to the person tested only if they are of
direct clinical importance to the person or the family.
Communication of unexpected findings to family
members of the person tested should only be
authorised by national law if the person tested refuses
expressly to inform them even though their lives are in
danger” (Principle 11).
This position has been developed by Principle 8.4
of Recommendation R (97) 5 of the Council of Europe
on Protection of Medical data [20]. According to this
Principle, the person subjected to genetic analysis must
be informed of unexpected findings if the domestic law
does not prohibit the giving of such information; or the
person himself has asked for this information; or the
information is not likely to cause serious harm to
his/her health, or to his/her consanguine or uterine
kin, to a member of his/her social family, or to 
a person who has a direct link with his/her genetic line,
unless domestic law provides other appropriate
safeguards. The person should also be informed if this
information is of direct importance to him/her for
treatment or prevention.
So, the Recommendation restricts the circumstances
in which the unexpected findings should not be
communicated. In conclusion, the doubtful cases that
remain at the moment of deciding on whether to report
of an unexpected finding are very limited. The cases
are those in which this information does not have
repercussions for the health of the individual involved
because the mutation found does not have great
clinical significance or there is no therapy or prevention
known, or it will not be transmitted to the offspring. In
these cases, according to Recommendation (97) 5 it
is not necessary to inform.
When consent is requested for using samples with
scientific research purposes, the most appropriate
behaviour is to ask the wish of the subject regarding the
communication of unexpected findings. Recommendation
R (97) 5 of the Council of Europe on the Protection of
medical data states that “Before a genetic analysis is
carried out, the data subject should be informed about
the objectives of the analysis and the possibility of
unexpected findings” (principle 5.4).
N No on n- -d di is sc cr ri im mi in na at ti io on n
The Explanatory Report of the Biomedicine
Convention [21] recognizes that the mapping out of
the human genome, which is advancing rapidly, as
well as the development of the genetic tests linked to
it, are likely to bring substantial advances in the
prevention of illnesses and the administration of
treatment. But genetic testing also raises considerable
concerns. Among these the most widespread is
probably the concern that genetic testing may become
a means of selection and discrimination.
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The fundamental principle established in Article 11
of the Biomedicine Convention is that any form of
discrimination against an individual on grounds of his
or her genetic heritage is prohibited, as has been
mentioned, but it cannot prohibit positive measures
which may be implemented with the aim of re-
establishing a certain balance in favour of those at 
a disadvantage because of their genetic inheritance.
According to the UNESCO Declaration it must be
ensured that human genetic data and human
proteomic data are not used for purposes that
discriminate against an individual or for purposes that
lead to the stigmatization of an individual, a family, 
a group or communities.
In this regard, appropriate attention should be paid
to the findings of population-based genetic studies and
behavioural genetic studies as well as to their
interpretations.
Human genetic data and human proteomic data
may be collected, processed, used and stored only for
the following purposes:
(1) diagnosis and health care, including screening
and predictive testing;
(2)  medical and other scientific research, including
epidemiological, especially population-based
genetic studies, as well as anthropological or
archaeological studies;
(3)  forensic medicine and civil, criminal and other
legal proceedings;
(4)  any other purpose consistent with the Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human
Rights and the international law of human rights.
It has been said that before a patient decides to
undergo genetic testing, he or she should be acquainted
through genetic counselling with the possible implications
for themselves and their blood relatives for insurance
and employment of having the test. In clinical genetic
practice this is referred to as the informed consent
procedure. But taking into account the general
prohibition of discrimination enacted in almost all the
national legal frameworks and in the mentioned
Convention on Biomedicine of the Council of Europe,
this precaution could suggest an unnecessary wrong
perception to the patient and to society.
To ensure non-discrimination practices, there has
been recommended a statement of a specific
regulation at the European level that develops the
provision of the Bioethics Convention according to
which, as said, any form of discrimination against 
a person on grounds of his or her genetic heritage is
prohibited [22].
P Pa at ti ie en nt t’ ’s s  r ri ig gh ht ts s  a an nd d  b bi io ol lo og gi ic ca al l  s sa am mp pl le es s
Scientific interest in the use of biological samples as
a research tool has increased simultaneously with the
increase in the knowledge of human genetics. In a rapidly
evolving field such as cancer genetics, it is inevitable that
research and clinical work will be closely entwined [23].
Researchers usually ask for the samples stored with
diagnostic purposes for their use in research [24].
In many countries, a legislative provision that
harmonizes the needs of the advances of science with
suitable protection of the rights of the subjects affected
does not exist. A regulation of the obtaining and
utilization of biological samples in scientific research
is needed. Some national and international institutions
have enacted several guidelines in this field, and in
general in the creation of biobanks [25].
We must highlight that UNESCO’s Declaration on
human genetic data applies, as stated in the first
article, to “human genetic data, human proteomic data
and to the biological samples from which they are
derived”; nevertheless, in my opinion, the expression
“which they are derived” is not accurate as it leads one
to think that the text applies only to samples that have
already been analysed, and actually, through the text,
the samples are protected also before this process.
We must also mention some documents of the
Council of Europe, for example Recommendation R
(92) 3 on genetic testing and screening for health care
purposes [26], which indicates in principle 8 that the
samples and the tissues of the body are supports of
information that must be protected in the same way as
processed personal data, and the most important one:
Recommendation R (06) 4 on research on biological
materials of human origin [27].
The Biomedicine Convention does not address this
particular question, but it contains some rules that must
be taken into account. The Additional Protocol to this
Convention, concerning biomedical research of 25
January, 2005, states that before being asked to
consent to participate in a research project, the persons
concerned shall be specifically informed, according to
the nature and purpose of the research, among other
things, of any foreseen potential further uses, including
commercial uses, of the research results, data or
biological materials (principle 13) [28]. In addition,
the Steering Committee on Bioethics published 
a proposal for a Protocol to this Convention on the use
of archived human biological materials in biomedical
research (17 October, 2002).
There does not exist a European community norm
(such as a Directive) regulating the use of human
biological samples in scientific research. Therefore, it
is necessary to attend to other principles in order to
solve the conflicts that arise in these situations.
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Directive 2004/23/EC on setting standards of quality
and safety for the donation, procurement, testing,
processing, preservation, storage and distribution of
human tissues and cells [29] lays down standards of
quality and safety for human tissues and cells intended
only for human applications as is stated in its article
one. This Directive does not apply to in vitro research:
as is stated in article 2: “This Directive shall apply to
the donation, procurement, testing, processing,
preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues
and cells intended for human applications and of
manufactured products derived from human tissues
and cells intended for human applications”.
In this normative framework reviewed, a text which
seems to be more specific and extensive in this field is
Recommendation R (06) 4 on research on biological
materials of human origin, so the most suitable is to
follow its criteria.
Depending on the original reason for obtaining the
biospecimens, research or other purposes (including the
practical clinical use for diagnostic or presymptomatic
genetic testing), two hypotheses can be distinguished.
If the sample has been obtained for research, the
aforementioned Recommendation states that “Information
and consent or authorisation to obtain such materials
should be as specific as possible with regard to any
foreseen research uses and the choices available in that
respect. An intervention should only be carried out to
obtain biological materials for storage for research
purposes if it complies with the Additional Protocol
concerning biomedical research” (principles 10 and 11).
According to this Protocol, “Research shall not involve
risks and burdens to the human being disproportionate
to its potential benefits. In addition, where the research
does not have the potential to produce results of direct
benefit to the health of the research participant, such
research may only be undertaken if the research entails
no more than acceptable risk and acceptable burden for
the research participant (…)” (article 6).
More problematic is the case when scientific
research wants to make use of “residual biological
materials”. In principal, the express consent to use the
sample for research purposes is required at the moment
of the consent to the intervention or extraction. However,
this does not always happen. The question that is raised
is whether the express consent of the subject is needed
to use the sample in scientific research.
We must take into account that the human biological
sample, from the legal point of view, should be
considered from a double perspective, since it has 
a double nature. On the one hand, it is a part separated
from the human body. On the other hand, it is a medium
of information. The rights of the subject in relation to the
sample vary depending on the perspective adopted.
Regarding the sample simply as a part removed of
the body, it must be taking into account that the body is
the “physical support of the personality”, that is to say,
the living human body is considered as a “person”. This
is opposed to the category “thing”, which is consequently
excluded as an object of rights. Nevertheless, the parts
of the body removed from it are not included in this
category, as they no longer form a part of the “physical
support of the personality”. As biological material
removed from the body, an extracted sample is neither
an element of the personality nor an object of fundamental
rights. It is a thing.
As it is known, in relation to its belonging, things
are patrimony (public or private) or not (because they
never belonged to anybody – res nullius – or they were
abandoned – res derelictae). In relation to commerce,
they are things in comercio or extra comercium.
The removed parts of the body are not public
domain as they belong neither to the State nor to the
cities. So, they are either res nullius or res derelictae,
or are of private property.
The extracted sample must be considered as the
property of the individual as it is a link that joins them,
from which the use of such derives the harm to the rights
of that individual. This is coherent with the right to free
disposition which the individual enjoys to donate parts
of the body, according to which the subject can decide
the destiny of his or her blood, organs and gametes.
The individual, as owner of the sample, has the power
of disposition, which has to be exercised through the
manifestation of her wish, in an express or presumed way.
Starting from the need of the subject’s consent as 
a requirement of the respect of her right to autonomy, it
can be considered appropriate to accept presumptions
and therefore not to demand express consent.
Nevertheless, article 22 of the Biomedicine
Convention seems contrary to this position. The
Convention states that “When in the course of an
intervention any part of a human body is removed, it may
be stored and used for a purpose other than that for
which it was removed, only if this is done in conformity
with appropriate information and consent procedures”.
However, it could be interpreted that appropriate consent
would be a presumed one. Furthermore, the appropriate
information could refer to the fact that the subject can
obtain all the information concerning the research. As 
a matter of fact, in the explanatory report (paragraph
137) it is stated that “The information and consent
arrangements may vary according to the circumstances,
thus allowing for flexibility since the express consent of
an individual to the use of parts of his body is not
systematically needed. Thus, sometimes, it will be
impossible, or very difficult, to find the persons concerned
again in order to ask for their consent. In some cases, it
will be sufficient for a patient or his or her representative,
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who have been duly informed (for instance, by means of
leaflets handed to the persons concerned at the hospital)
not to express their opposition. In other cases, depending
on the nature of the use to which the removed parts are
to be put, express and specific consent will be necessary,
in particular where sensitive information is collected about
identifiable individuals.”
Moreover, article 12 of Recommendation (06) 4,
established that “Biological materials removed for
purposes other than storage for research should only
be made available for research activities with appropriate
consent or authorization, or in accordance with the
provisions of Article 22 paragraph 1.ii”, and this refers
to identifiable biological materials.
In fact, regarding the sample as a medium of
personal information, it is important to distinguish
between personal and non-personal (anonymised)
information. In the first case, following the principles
of protection of personal data, express consent must
be required.
Taking into account the Directive on data
protection, the recommendation of the Council of
Europe mentioned states:
i) Identifiable biological materials are those biological
materials which, alone or in combination with
associated data, allow the identification of the persons
concerned either directly or through the use of a code.
In the latter case, the user of the biological materials
may either:
a) have access to the code: the materials are
hereafter referred to as “coded materials” or
b) not have access to the code, which is under the
control of a third party: the materials are hereafter
referred to as “linked anonymised materials”.
ii) Non-identifiable biological materials, hereafter
referred to as “unlinked anonymised materials”, are
those biological materials which, alone or in
combination with associated data, do not allow, with
reasonable efforts, the identification of the persons
concerned.
Unlinked anonymised biological materials may be
used in research provided that such use does not
violate any restrictions placed by the person concerned
prior to the anonymisation of the materials.
A An no on ny ym mi is sa at ti io on n   s sh ho ou ul ld d   b be e   v ve er ri if fi ie ed d   
b by y   a an n   a ap pp pr ro op pr ri ia at te e   r re ev vi ie ew w   p pr ro oc ce ed du ur re e
This criterion must be applied to research with
biological samples and its storage in biobanks. If the
samples are kept in a manner that establishes the
possibility of associating them with a subject through
reasonable means, the principles of protection of
personal data must be applied. Therefore, the express
consent of the subjects must be required in order to
analyse them. If the link between the sample and the
identity cannot be established, the sample is made
anonymous and therefore the data obtained must not
be considered as personal.
However, according to the Recommendation of the
Council of Europe, there could be an exception to this
general rule, because it is established that the
biological material can be used in a research project
without the consent of the person concerned when an
independent evaluation certifies that:
– contacting the person concerned is not possible
with reasonable efforts, and:
a) the research addresses an important scientific
interest;
b) the aims of the research could not reasonably
be achieved using biological materials for which
consent can be obtained;
c) there is no evidence that the person concerned
has expressly opposed such research use.
D Di is sc cu us ss si io on n   a an nd d   C Co on nc cl lu us si io on ns s
Since the nineteen nineties there has been a concern
to develop rules referring to patients’ rights in genetic
diagnosis. Researchers and physicians would like to have
practical criteria to carry out their work with respect to
the subjects’ rights with juridical security.
Several texts have been enacted from national and
international institutions, with juridical or ethical nature.
From the international perspective, the Declaration of
UNESCO on human genetic data and the
Recommendation of the Council of Europe on research
on biological materials of human origin are especially
important. But these instruments do not have juridical
force – not as a national or international law would have.
Some European countries have laws regarding the
use of genetic information, but often only on very
specific aspects (for example assurance), and there are
several differences between these criteria.
The European Union Directive on data protection,
that has been incorporated in the national legal
framework of the member states, is a good reference
in the use of personal data in general, but not enough
regarding the use of genetic personal data. The work
in the development and interpretation of the Directive
that is now being carried out in the European Union
could be an adequate way to unify criteria and
elaborate juridical European instruments. In this
process, the principles followed in other international
texts mentioned have to be taken into account.
The objective should be to develop concrete rules
to solve the conflicts in practice, but it has to be
remembered that laws cannot refer to every particular
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case, and that it is difficult to eliminate the factor of the
physician’s decision.
Regarding scientific research, the Ethics Committees
have an important role in the review of the projects.
This control, which includes a review of the informed
consent of the research subjects, ensures that the
appropriate criteria are observed and gives the
researcher a guarantee of good practice. In relation
to the diagnosis, the principle to follow is that the
genetic diagnosis should be established within the
framework of genetic counselling, meaning adequate
structures, protocols, professionals and multidisciplinary
services, to provide global care for the patient.
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